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  ISRAACA Statement Policy on Clan and Clanism |
| <img align=right src="sawir/logo.gif" id=right border=0>1) <b>Policy Statement and Issue Analysis:</b>
<b>Article III, Section D of the UIUS</b> Articles of Incorporation, as revised, commits the organization to "promote the de-institutionalization of clanism, and exclude it from Somali national life."
The above statement, in and of itself, is sufficient to serve as a clear policy position for UIUS, in its current capacity as an advocate organization, regarding the thorny issue of "clan and clanism" in the Somali society. The aim of this proposed policy statement is, however, more expansive than meets the eye. To begin with, the austerity of the pronouncement is indicative of the fact that UIUS members and other like minded Somalis, will no longer tolerate the sleazy and, at times, criminal practices associated with clanism.
Some of the more egregious examples of clanism as practiced by and foisted on the people by governments for nearly 30 years since the nominal national-independence of 1960, include:
1) The prevalence of government officials who would stop at nothing to gain political advantage without regard the adverse impacts their dishonest ways were having on others.
2) Individuals in positions of authority who would devise or benefit from rackets designed to circumvent laws, and in the process damage citizens' innate sense of duty, integrity, faithfulness to good order including the simple desire to be able to play by the rules.
3) Officials who would utilize corrupt-practices such as nepotism to serve sectarian interests, at the expense of the national interest.
4) The blatant bigotry in which entire clans, regions and communities were singled out for vicious, repressive measures including such high crimes as rape, murder, and the confiscation of private property.
The decade of 1990s saw the nation gripped by a sadistic civil war, orchestrated by degenerate warlords. The devastating war all but crippled the Somalia's social, political, and cultural infrastructure and left the economy in total shambles in its wake. It is in this dark period, marked by pogroms and mass slaughter of innocent Somalis, for no reason other than belonging to the wrong clan that the bottom seems to have fallen off the society. To be sure, there were, during these horror-filled episodes, numerous clan-oriented transgressions by all the crazed militias in both the southern and northern regions of the country. The resultant horrific images of the Somali people became seared on the world map and the consciousness of the international community. As a direct result, the nation is seen now as made up of either the victims of, the perpetrators of or witnesses to deranged, senseless blood feuds that have come to typify the depth of depravity to which humanity can sink. In the recent UIUS debate on the topic of Clan and Clanism, all the discussants condemned clanism as a particularly odious practice that had
harmed, and continues to harm the Somali nation. The informed opinions expressed can be categorized into two main groups.
One group recommended that UIUS should advocate no less than doing away with the clan system altogether, lot, stock and barrel. After examining the issue, in its totality, this group declared to have found no redeemable social value in the clan system. So they strongly recommend that, at the dawn of the 21st century, Somalis should be able to cut their losses, and bail out of that decrepit ship, we call the clan system, before it sinks the nation of predominantly pastoral population into a sea of misery.
In terms of solutions, though, the group shied away from identifying a readily available antidote, from within the Somali cultural atlas, that can fill the void that would be left by the demise of the scorned-perhaps deservedly so-clan system.
A second group counseled that, whether we like it or not, the clan-based traditions are deeply ingrained in the fabric of the Somali society. Instead of hastily pronouncing it dead, they suggested that for starters the xeer-based traditional clan system not be confused with its evil, foster-child-clanism. This group further argued that, from a strictly cultural standpoint, the traditional clan system has at the very least earned a ceremonial role to play in the Somali society. They pointed out how, for many centuries, clan forums had been the principal venues for cultural expression throughout the nation. They also cited how all the renowned Somali epic poetry flourished within the clan milieu, and was disseminated through clan forums. Similarly, they mentioned that the traditional clan system had been for a long time the repository whence a number of other cultural expressions (inclusive of 'the good, the bad and the ugly') emanate. Finally, they noted that in Somalis' traditional celebrations, whether in a pastoral, subsistence farming, or
maritime setting, much of the pomp and circumstance is still carried out within the clan-based traditions.
It is important to note, however, that both groups identified clan-based politics as a singularly abhorrent invention that is inimical to the well-being and the progress of the nation as a whole. To the extent that there was divergence of views, it concerned the modalities of bringing about the desired effect: a democratic Somali state. Yet, key questions remain unanswered: should Somalis cut the umbilical cord to clanism at once? Or, should the nation seek a more incremental change, informed by the culture itself, through education buttressed by the workings of the democratic processes?
2) Options and Risk Analysis:
A man once asked a camel whether it preferred going uphill or downhill. The camel said ' what is important to me is not the uphill or downhill, it is the load'!
The scourge of clanism presents Somalis with stark choices. They include:
1) to go forth into the 21st century-the era of genetic engineering, nanotechnology, and (thinking) robotics-
counting on the efficacy of a primordial system of social organization to deliver the goods, or
2) Institute a system of participatory democracy informed by Islamic values.
History teaches us that coercion is not an effective method of conversion. The UIUS, having opted for a federalist form of government in Somalia, should present this policy for consideration by the Somali people in lieu of clanism. The message has to be direct and uncomplicated in outlining the critical choices available from which to select an alternative system.
Such a message first and foremost has to emphasize the imperative for strict adherence to a new dispensation: the equality before the law of all the clans, communities and regions. In particular, the clarion call must be sounded that the UIUS will not put up with any injustice to be visited upon our Somali brothers and sisters in those communities that
suffered historic discrimination and oppression, (often at the hands of fellow countrymen). For when all is said and done the promise of an unfailing system of social justice must become a reality in the lives of all who live in the country without regard to clan origin, ethnicity, race or creed.
3) Options and Risk Analysis:
Though the UIUS has, through a civilized debate, narrowed its options of dealing with the cacophony of clan and clanism in Somalia to the two above stated positions, no magic potion exists which can be brought to bear to loosen grip clanism has on Somalia. Thus, it stands to reason that it's sordid past as well and present are examined in light of the principles of democracy and fair play. This could also be a point of departure for venturing a prognosis on what is likely to occur in the future.
Through this type of evaluation, one can apply activity-based costing to sort out the actual cost of clanism to the nation in human capital losses as well as in material terms. With the information they could glean from such data, Somalis may, at long last, be able to reject clanism on the basis of enlightened self-interest.
The types of costs Somalis routinely incurred in the past, and carried on to the present anarchic era, as a result of the clanist mindset, include, but are not limited to the following:
1) The countless lost opportunities by businesses forced to deal with inept officials installed in high places due to nepotism;
2) The waste, fraud and abuse of the public trust and fiduciary responsibilities;
3) The lack of equal justice;
4) The abuse of power whereby public offices were converted to dens of corruption; and
5) The lack of security resulting in the pilfering of private property Still, if the people are fully informed, there is a high probability that Somalis everywhere will have no problem endorsing a viable system of social organization that: A) supplants clanism, and B) leads to the installation of a just and democratic order.
4) Conclusion:
A consensus among Somalis has now evolved to the effect that maintenance of clanism is more trouble than it is worth. Still, the declaration of an anti-clanism policy on the part of UIUS is not tantamount to being able to extricate the nation from its fangs. The cold fact is Somalis can not be expected to take to the policy statement instinctively like fish to water. Out of fear, some people might even be inclined to go the other way.
So, to be effective, the UIUS policy on clanism maybe approached in the manner in which a fascination is developed. In this scenario, it is not uncommon for researchers to extract a mild dose from a poison to fashion its antidote. Likewise, Somalis might, on an interim basis, be excused if they prolong their absorption of its essence, before abandoning the beast of clanism as a part of their clan consciousness. This would a
way for a greater number of Somalis to pledge allegiance to anti-clanism in favor of a national self-identity. Only they should not be expected to do solely on a leap of faith. Any anti-clanism campaign worthy of its salt will have to be coached in strategic terms; it would necessarily preclude instant gratification.
That the average Somali will, for some time to come, be identifying with his clan at the socio-cultural level is explicable. It does not, however, follow that he/she has to in anyway practice or participate in clanism. In the meanwhile, to bring about the required cultural transformation at the national level, serious qualitative and quantitative analyses must be undertaken. Somalis have to be convinced in concrete terms that its infinitely more beneficial for them to find a sense of pride, loyalty, belonging and mutual support from the wider national culture. The paralyzing culture of clanism marked by mutual
suspicion of neighbors must come to close to avert the permanency of the ever-expanding circle of Somalis in the Diaspora.
5) Strategies and Interim Steps:
A non-clanist policy cannot be attained in vacuum; it has to be developed as a function of a comprehensive plan for effecting good governance. The palpable short-term steps should include, but may not limited to:
1) Inaugurate UIUS as an effective, credible Somali advocacy organization,
2) Adopt the draft non-clanist policy to guide the organization, and
3) Devise an educational/informational system for disseminating the policy, and seeking a buy-in from the Somali public.
Concerning strategic goals, the UIUS needs not 'reinvent the wheel'. All the organization has to do is to review existing models, and onsider adopting the best practices available in this regard, while avoiding the pitfalls of certain options.
In his "Islam and Liberal Democracy: Recognizing Pluralism," Journal of Democracy 7.2 (1996) 86-89, Laith Kubba addressed both the remedies and the pitfalls: Islam teaches principles of freedom, human dignity, equality, governance by contract, popular sovereignty, and the rule of law that are compatible with but not identical to the cognate principles that belong to the intellectual heritage of liberal democracy. A look at history suggests that the main obstacles facing Muslims in their attempts to achieve open political systems and democratic governments are 1) a deeply rooted authoritarian political culture, and 2) manipulated interpretations of the Qur'an [End Page 86]
The Somali nation, no doubt, fits the above scenario as clanism is based on the worst kind of 'authoritarian political culture'. Thus, to prevent a Somali government from practicing clanism it must be limited in the first place. Checks and balances must also be built into the constitution to ensure that no branch of government can supplant the other. Beyond that, regional autonomy and the promulgation of a strict anti-clanism laws would go a long way to creating a harmonious atmosphere in the land of the Somalis.
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| Added on: |
03/20/2004 |
| Author/Source: |
Pan-Somali Council for Peace and Democracy |
| Author's email/website: |
israac.org |
| Posted by: |
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