Pan-Somali Council For Peace and Democracy

Title:

ISRAACA Policy Statement on SOMALILAND & SECESSION

<img align=right src="sawir/logo.gif" id=right border=0>OBJECTIVES: The goal of this policy paper is to establish organizational guidelines that would enable ISRAACA as a civic organization, to address the issue of secession that has transpired in northern Somalia. The paper also gives a bird's eye view of the recent history of northern Somalia, from the advent of colonialism to the present. Furthermore, the paper attempts to deal with the prevailing secessionist camp's arguments in a manner that is devoid of emotion, ranker and clan instrumentalization (clanism). The target audience of this paper is the Somali people in general, and northern Somalis in particular -not the small number of elite that have succeeded in making the misery of the Somali people and the secession argument a veritable cottage industry. The guidelines and arguments presented in this paper are meant to outline a new approach and usher in a new perspective to the debate about the future of Somalia. INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS: SOMALI IDENTITY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE As the subject matter of this paper deals with the soul of the Somali identity, at least from the people's prospective, and much of the secession's argument can be rebutted, safely, from this point of view, it is important at this time to revisit the identity of the Somali people and their social structure. The Somali people are one of the most homogeneous societies in Africa. The epicenter for identity of our people lies with their common faith, language, cultural heritage and way of life. Somalis are traditionally pastoralist�s society, with fast-growing (since the independence) urban populations and cultivators. The social structure of the Somali people is comprised of a confederate system of independent and autonomous clan/sub-clan communities congregated together by common habitat. The logistics and the legal matters for dispute resolutions are facilitated by inter/intra-clan xeer system, which throughout our history has allowed our society to function as an unconventional nation based on mutual respect amongst neighboring clans, and the desire for peace, order and individual as well as communal freedom. Each clan, in these confederates, has a name (pseudo-identity) of a genealogical origin. However, the Somali identity is universal to all of the clan confederates that form the joints connecting the nation, and serves as the only societal identity of all of the inhabitants of the Horn. Each Somali clan or sub-clan has its own system of governance, and for all intents and purposes functions as a sovereign nation. The genius of the Somali traditional governance system has been that, until the emergence of clanism, there have rarely been clan groupings based solely on blood relations. Relationships among clans have been formed or severed based on mutual interest or distrust-not unlike today's relationships among nations. Each clan or group of clans inhabits a specific locality with generally acknowledged geographical boundaries. In the absence of a central authority, such traditional way of life and coexistence has allowed Somali communities to sustain harmonic and mutual interdependence for centuries. LAND Speaking of the frontiers of newly independent Guinea, the Guinean Historian Jean Suret-Canale stated: "They are completely arbitrary. They do not reflect the limits of natural regions, or the limits of separate ethnic groups. They were shaped in their detail by the chances of conquest or of compromise between colonial powers." Mr. Suret-Canale's argument is not only true for Guinea but for the whole continent of Africa, and the outrage is all the more pronounced when one examines how the Somali nation was carved up and slashed apart. The nineteen European plenipotentiaries who met in Berlin in November 1884 and who were charged with the task of dividing up Africa among European powers had no major argument when it came to dividing up Somalia; but their knowledge of the continent was as dismal as their kin who had the opportunity to carve up the "middle east" in the 1920 Paris conference. The British politician Lord Balfour commented that the President of the United States and the Prime ministers of England and France looked like "Three all-powerful men, all-ignorant men, sitting there [Paris] and carving up continents"-the sentiment of all Africans, and especially Somalis indeed. Of course, Ignorance and unbridled greed had to have determined the future of the Somali State. How else can one explain the slapdash borders drawn up to separate Somalis into British Somaliland, French Somaliland and Italian Somaliland? The goal of the Europeans in that Berlin conference was to work out an "equitable" land grabbing formula for the Europeans, and the cultural and territorial integrity of the Africans were never an issue. It wouldn't be farfetched to assume that if the French were not satisfied with their share of Somalia, the French portion of Somalia could have been extended as far as the British and Italians would tolerate-say to today's Galkacayo, Hiiran or Mogadishu. In fact, the Italians demurred at the small portion that was allocated to them, and protested until in 1905 when the English gave them the inter-riverine areas. It all depended on how satisfied were the European cousins with the spoils; and It was all-arbitrary. Therefore, the former British Protectorate or British Somaliland which nowadays has been reincarnated as "Somaliland" constitutes neither a clan name nor confederate(s) of clans of a distinct society (universal sub-identity of the Somali people); The name merely describes the arbitrarily defined geographical localities of the former British protectorate of Somalia. Though the people of the British "Somaliland" and Italian "Somaliland" have regained their independence from their respective colonial powers at separate dates (June 26 and July 1, 1960, respectively), the colonization of Somalia does not establish, legally or morally, the redefinition of the identity of our people. SECESSION In a recent interview, the head of the Hargeisa Administration, Mr. Ibrahim Igal, stated that the "history of the Somali people is [that] they have never had a central authority. We were independent tribes and we lived together in equality. We fought over water and over grazing now and then, but nobody ruled over anybody else," [Hargeisa, 28 May IRIN]. At face value, Igal's characterization of the structure of the Somali clans/sub-clans shouldn't be worthy of serious consideration as he reiterates universally accepted realities about Somalia. But when one takes into account that Mr. Igal has successfully established himself as the foremost advocate of the secessionist movement's causa sine qua non-Kinship hegemony- his statements become a testimonial exhibit to the bankrupt morals of today's Somali political leadership-- on one hand, he maintains his power by pulling at the emotional strings of the populace, while on the other hand presenting himself as a rational leader and a statesman to the outside world. The seeming irrationality of the political positions of Mr. Igal and other Somali leaders has its roots, in part, in the political system that Somalis dubbed clanism. This Somali-specific ideology is an of-shoot of ethnic nationalism. The attendant factors of ethnic nationalism--historical myth, appeal to blood loyalty, sentimentality, and the legitimization or glorification of violence--are all present in clanism. The sad reality is that Somalia's current crops of leaders owe their respective positions to a successful appeal to Clanism; therefore, they are beholden to the extreme wings of their clan. And can't, even if some of them wish to, develop or engage in a comprehensive solution to Somalia. They may show some spasm of rational thought here and there, but ultimately they are beholden to the whims of the more irrational wing of their kin. It is important to note that, in colonial Somalia, the British Empire saw it beneficial to exercise its control by exploiting the existing Somali social systems, ushering in what became commonly known as the Indirect Rule. Britain simply placed another layer of administration over northern Somalia's established governance systems. The Sultans and Garads became allies and contact persons of the British Administration. In this process, the British first entered into separate agreements with the clans in northern Somalia whereas each clan was promised, among other things, protection of its territory by the mighty English superpower-hence, the name Protectorate. In Article One of the 1886 British treaty with the Warsangeli states that the British promises the "Protection of her Mighty the Queen Empress, and the tribe binds itself." Article three of the said agreement states that the clan agrees not to "Hold any communication with any other foreign nation." Neither this specific agreement nor all the other agreements between the British and Somalis are something to be proud of as these agreements "dispossessed" Somalia's traditional leaders, legitimized colonialism and suppressed the natural progression of Somalia's traditional governance system. Nonetheless, the agreements' importance to the current debate about secession is that they reinforce the ten year old argument of the anti-secessionist northern Somalis that all clans are equal and independent stakeholders of the destiny of the region - an argument which the secessionists have attempted to suppress in order to present a facade of unanimity to their cause. The independence struggle waged in Somalia, and specifically in Northern Somalia, was primarily anti colonial nationalist struggle, and secondarily a "social struggle." There were no ideological or philosophical arguments that bolstered the struggle. Freedom was generally seen as a panacea and the union was envisioned as a fair and a benevolent she-camel with unlimited capacity to produce milk. The general sentiment was that with the birth of Maandeeq everything will be all right. In this struggle, the northern communities belonged to mainly two clan-based parties, SNL (Isaaq) and USP (Gadaburse, Dhulbahante and Warsangeli). Although USP and SNL were clan-based political parties, the parties were democratic in spirit and action. There were no clan-induced hatred or intrigues. Eventually, the staunchly pro-union USP and apprehensive SNL came together and sent a unified delegation to Mogadishu to work out the terms of the union with the southerners. After the birth of the Republic, unfortunately, few urban elite hijacked Mandeeq and turned it into a "clientelist" tool. Clientelism slowly gave way to cruder mutative forms and eventually to clanism, until the state collapsed in 1990. It would only stand to reason that after the collapse of the Somali Republic in 1990, local government power would revert back to each community's traditional governance system. Not withstanding periodic bloodlettings and the scourge of secessionism the northern Somalia's traditional leaders succeeded to achieve this aim with tangible results. There also was an opportunity to reconstitute a fairer and representative state, and even review the act of the union which has come under criticism from northerners who by then came to believe they were railroaded by the southerners. Unfortunately, the separatist camp, in their zeal to advance their goal of secession, had laid this opportunity to waste. While a citizen demanded review of the act of the union, in retrospect, is morally and legally justified, such a review must reflect the genuine wishes of the Somali communities of any region that may sponsor the review, and the review must be overseen by legitimate and representative parties/government - elected or selected by the people of the communities involved. In such a review, logic and tradition dictates that each clan of the confederates of the region must be viewed as an independent, autonomous, and equal entity. No clan has legal or moral right to interfere with the independent and autonomous rights and destiny of another clan. In addition, the review must guarantee the unity of the Somali people caught in middle and allow the freedom of movement mandated by the pastoralism way of life of our majority, which have indigenous rights over any established modern state or authorities. The act of the reunification after colonial rule was inspired by the public's desire in preserving the unity of their ethnically, culturally, and religiously homogeneous communities and the awareness of their highly interdependent way of life. Therefore, dismemberment of such a reunion, which is the aim of "Somaliland," must be examined in the backdrop of the desires and the will of the people that led to the reunification. It is unfortunate that after more than forty years into the desired state of independence of the Somali people the aspiration of our people for self-determination and prosperity for all is hijacked by fears, mistrusts, suspicions towards each other's clan and leeriness towards any form of central authority. These fears, mistrust and suspicions are undeniably the product of clan hegemony, injustices committed by clans against others in the name of the State, tyranny, and the policies of the totalitarian military regime and the civilian governments that preceded it. Regrettably, instead of a true desire for self-determination and better future for all, the massacres committed by the military dictatorship government of Siyad Barre against the people of Hargeisa and Burao, the terror and the killings committed by the SNM and Egal's self-declared state authorities hallmark the conundrum of the Northwest's secession sentiments, and the clan-based polarization of these otherwise brotherly communities. RESOLUTIONS AFTER examining all pertinent arguments put forth by those advocating for secession, ISRAACA concludes that there are no historical, cultural, economical, or rational political arguments for the dismemberment of Somalia. ISRAACA argues that the rebirth of the name "Somaliland," more than four decades after the hard earned self-determination and the reunification of our people, is an imprudent sanctioning of the arbitrary land and people's separations inflicted upon us by the European colonists. ISRAACA acknowledges that the climate and motives for secession are neither in the best interest nor do they reflect the spirit of the true wishes of our people. Consequently, the secession derives of the current "Somaliland" authorities cannot be viewed as a solution or compensation to the countless innocent lives needlessly wasted in the aforementioned massacres. How could it be when the regrettable fact is that the crusaders of this secession drive, the elite in Hargeisa, were, and still are, part and parcel of those that had pauperized Somalia and rendered it a haunted house of misery and mayhem? These manipulations of the citizenry's emotions only serve as added insults to the past atrocities and psychological injuries of the Somalis of these regions. These tactics are nothing more than the perpetuation of the divide and rule policies of the selfish and greedy post-independence political elite of our society; it also demonstrates the perils of blind clan loyalty. RECOMMENDATIONS In an attempt to heal the past wounds and to bridge the hearts and minds of all Somali communities, ISRAACA must: ADVOCATE for the creation of a truth and reconciliation commission, akin to that of South Africa, so the public may hear the silent voices of our sons' and daughters' ghost that is crying for justice. The commission must have the powers to express regret and sorrow, on behalf of all of us, for the atrocities and human rights violations committed against the civilian population of our Northern (and central communities) by the previous Military regime. The commission must seek that the perpetrators of these crimes be brought to justice. The commission must also address and seek justice for crimes committed by warlords and their factions. STRIVE to bring forth an atmosphere of tolerance, democratic pluralism, and respect for human rights, which will safeguard the collective interest of our people. ENGAGE in an organized conversations with Diaspora Somalis in North America and Europe (both supporters and opponents of the secession) and opinion-leaders back home in order to systematically and methodically gauge the public sentiments and evaluate prospects for real reconciliation amongst our people. REESTABLISH our lost sense of civic nationalism and celebrate the contributions and the sacrifices made by the common men and women of our communities for the establishment of our statehood and the reunification of our people.

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03/20/2004

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Pan-Somali Council for Peace and Democracy

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